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It is submitted that experienced appraisers are essential to an effective condemnation procedure. The advantages accruing therefrom seem obvious. Who
are better equipped to analyze the extreme opinions of the contesting expert
witnesses and ascertain the bases of such opinions? Because of their experience,
the awards would be uniform, eliminating the inducement to gamble. The
long-range effect of such a tribunal best illustrates its necessity. If, in practice, compensation approximated the condemner's offer, and there is no reason
why this should not be so, the incentive to contest this issue will be further
removed.
The report of the commissioners to the court appointing them should be conclusive on all parties, and the court's inquiry should be directed only to the
question of whether the rules of damages were applied. If a party feels the
award is arbitrary or that a commissioner is biased, that issue should be raised
by motion. The only issues appealable would be those of authority to take and
the theory of damages applied. As a practical matter disposition of the former
would have long since been accomplished.
The procedure as it now stands within New York is redundant and almost
arbitrary. Its sheer volume is, in itself, a strong argument for reform. That
New York must revise its procedure is clear. Revision can result only in
improvement.
TRAFFIC-A MOVING PROBLEM
Traffic congestion,' among the many municipal problems pressing for solution, 2 is not confined to our century. In Rex v. Cross,3 Lord Ellenborough
made the timeless remark, "no one can make a stable-yard of the King's highway."' 4 With the advent of the automobile, however, the problem has greatly
changed from the daily routine that was witnessed in London a century ago.
At that time, the early morning brought "the streams of walkers, two, three and
four miles long, converging on the city."r' As it was then, it is today, a constant struggle to maintain highways and streets at their optimum and to establish and maintain proper communities.
The term "traffic generators" is used to describe certain land uses and their
relative capacity to precipitate traffic congestion. A failure to recognize the
relationship between traffic congestion and the related use of contiguous lands
1. Traffic congestion implies all the nuisances, inconveniences, overcrowding and hazards
to which the public generally may be exposed. "The incidents of traffic congestion include,
among other things, noise, fumes, the intrusion of automobile lights, the blocking of private
,driveways by parked cars, and delays in normal travel for those using the highways. But
most important are the increased dangers to injury of persons and property." Milwaukee
Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen, 214 Ore. 281, 310, 330 P.2d 5, 18-19 (1958), cert.

denied, 359 U.S. 436 (1959).
2. 1 Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice § 208 (2d ed. 1953).
3. 3 Camp. 224, 170 Eng. Rep. 1362 (1812).
4. Id. at 227, 170 Eng. Rep. at 1363.
S. Holden, The City of London, A Record of Destruction and Survival 166 (1951).
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has led to statements such as "in essence the problem (traffic congestion) begins in the street and ends there."O
The first comprehensive zoning ordinance7 in the United States was adopted
by New York City in 1916. s The problems of traffic generation and congestion
were very much on the mind of the New York Commission. The commission
realized that the great bulk and density of urban buildings produced a concomitant
concentration of employment in the downtown area resulting in traffic conditions that necessitated separation of factories and shopping centers. "Traffic
conditions are the crux of the situation. It is vital to the existence of the
city," the commission reported, "that it maintain such conditions of street
traffic that . . . will protect the entire Fifth Avenue and Broadway section.
.1o While it cannot be said that traffic generation and congestion were the
sole forces that motivated the 1916 resolution, it can be said with certitude
that traffic was a motivating factor. 1
TRAFFIc CONSIDERED

I ENACTING ZONING ORINANCES

The power of the state to enact zoning ordinances'- may be delegated to
6. City & County of Denver v. Denver Buick, Inc., 141 Colo. 121, 145, 347 P2d 919, 933
(1960).
7. The term first used was "districting." "However, the word 'zoning' soon caught the
popular fancy, and by common consent the older term has been dropped in ordinary
parlance, the word 'zoning' taking its place throughout the country." Ba-Ctt, Zoning 21
(1940).
S. The zoning resolution was passed July 25, 1916, pursuant to N.Y. Secs. Laws 1901,
ch. 466, as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1916, ch. 497, §§ 242-a, 242-b, which amended the
New York City Charter. See Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp., 229 N.Y. 313, 12
N.E. 209 (1920) (upholding resolution as a proper exercie of the police power).
The constitutionality of comprehensive zoning, however, has gone virtually unquestioned since the Supreme Court decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926).
9. See N.Y.C. Comm'n on Building Districts and Restrictions, Final Report (June 2, 1916).
10. Id. at 19.
11. The emphasis of the comment will be upon developing communities rather than the
existing urban communities. In the latter, the height bulk and density of buildings are
the causes of traffic congestion. Municipalities such as New York, Chicago, Detroit and
Cleveland are among a few faced with this seemingly insurmountable problem. In areas
such as these the problem is much more complex and it has been suggested that automobiles
must be kept off the urban streets, since that "is the practical, realistic, and only cour-c
to effective relief from street traffic congestion." Bauer & Constello, Tramnit Modernization
and Street Traffic Control IS (1950). It would appear that effective city planning coupled
with positive zoning and mass transportation is the answer. See Owen, The Ictropolitan
Transportation Problem (1956). See also Mitchell & Rapkin, Urban Traffic; A Function of
Land Use (1954).
12. The power to enact zoning ordinances is an exercise of the police power and is exelusively within the jurisdiction of the state. Kass v. Hedgpcth, 226 N.C. 405, 33 SE2d
164 (1946). See generally Rhyne, Municipal Law § 32-3 (1957). The constitutionality of
any zoning ordinance, therefore, depends upon its relationship to public health, cafety and
general welfare. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
Traffic may be considered, therefore only to the extent that it falls within the ambit of
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municipalities, counties, villages and townships by statute or home rule amend14
ments. 13 Generally, however, the delegation is effectuated by enabling acts,
whereby the town, village and county boards are limited to the purpose set
forth therein. 15 A typical purpose is "to lessen congestion in the streets."10
In order to effectuate this purpose, zoning ordinances have been passed excluding from residential districts gasoline stations,17 apartment houses,' 8 boarding houses, 19 factories" and other uses having a common tendency to generate
traffic. Zoning ordinances providing for off-street parking 2' have also been
upheld by the courts as a valid exercise of the police power.2 2 Though churches
this relationship. In the report submitted by the New York Commission in 1916, traffic was
catalogued under general welfare. N.Y.C. Comm'n on Building Districts and Restrictions,
Final Report § 53 (June 2, 1916).
13. Valley View Village, Inc. v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955). "Municipalities
have no inherent police power." Turner v. Kansas City, 354 Mo. 857, 865, 191 S.W.2d 612,
616 (1945). Therefore, they have no inherent zoning power, and to enact zoning ordinances
a grant of power must come from the state. A grant to counties, villages and townships Is
upheld as a valid delegation of authority. See, e.g., Di Salle v. Giggal, 128 Colo. 208, 261
P.2d 499 (1953); Wakefield v. Kraft, 202 Md. 136, 96 A.2d 27 (1953) ; Lionshead Lake,
Inc. v. Wayne Township, 10 NJ. 165, 89 A.2d 695 (1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919
(1953); Jefferson County v. Timmel, 261 Wis. 39, 51 N.W.2d 518 (1952).
14. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40:55-32 (1940); N.Y. Village Law § 175.
15. See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40:55-32 (1940); N.Y. Town Law § 263; N.Y. Village
Law § 177.
16. Ibid.
17. E.g., Suburban Tire & Battery Co. v. Village of Mamaroneck, 304 N.Y. 971, 110
N.E.2d 894 (1953) (gasoline station prohibited in residential district). See also Socony
Mobile Oil Co. v. Township of Ocean, 56 N.J. Super. 310, 153 A.2d 67 (Super. Ct, 1959)
(gasoline filling stations prohibited within 1500 feet of each other).
18. Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 Pac. 381 (1925); Wulfsohn v.
Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 150 N.E. 120 (1925). Both cases were decided before the Supreme
Court decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
19. E.g., Baddour v. City of Long Beach, 279 N.Y. 167, 18 N.E.2d 18 (1938), rehearing
denied, 279 N.Y. 794, 19 N.E.2d 90, appeal dismissed, 308 U.S. 503 (1939). See also Philadelphia, Pa., Zoning and Planning Code §§ 14-201 to -216 (1959).
20. E.g., Ware v. City of Wichita, 113 Kan. 153, 214 Pac 99 (1923). See also Philadelphia, Pa., Zoning and Planning Code §§ 14-201 to -216 (1959).
21. Off-street parking has been defined as follows: "parking space, off-street - An offstreet parking space shall comprise not less than 180 square feet of parking stall plus necessary maneuvering space. Space for maneuvering incidental to parking or unparking shall not
encroach upon any public way. Every off-street parking space shall be accessible from a
public way." Bair & Bartley, The Text of a Model Zoning Ordinance, With Commentary
§ 18 (Public Administration Clearing Service of the Univ. of Florida 1958, No. 16).
22. See, e.g., Allendale Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Grossman, 30 N.J. 273,
152 A.2d 569 (1959) (church refused a building permit because its plans did not provide
for off-street parking as required by ordinance); State ex rel. Associated Land & Inv.
Corp. v. City of Lyndhurst, 168 Ohio St. 289, 154 N.E.2d 435 (1958) (dictum) ; State ex rel.
Gordon v. Rhodes, 156 Ohio St. 81, 100 N.E.2d 225 (1951); Appeal of Jehovah's Witnesses,
183 Pa. Super. 219, 130 A.2d 240, appeal dismissed sub nom. Swift v. Borough of Bethel,
355 U.S. 40 (1957) (zoning ordinance requiring one parking space for every five seats
upheld). But see Board of Zoning Appeals v. Decatur, Ind. Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses,
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are traffic generators and subject to reasonable restrictions73 they may not, by
the weight of authority, be excluded from residential districts 24
In reviewing these cases, the majority of the courts have recognized traffic
problems only implicitly, since the "courts do not inquire into the facts or
reasons which motivate the passage of a zoning ordinance, and all questions
relative to the wisdom or desirability of particular restrictions in the ordinance
rest with the legislative body creating it."- 5 They have made it clear, however,
that regulations affecting traffic, when reasonable, will not be invalidated F0
233 Ind. &3, 117 N.E.2d 115 (1954) (ordinance requiring one parking space for every fix
seats restricted freedom of worship and unconstitutional). Contra, City & County of
Denver v. Denver Buick, Inc., 141 Colo. 122, 347 P.2d 919 (19GO) (off-treet par ing requirements are unconstitutional).
While off-street parking requirements are valid to alleviate the traffic problem, a zoning
classification in which only parking and storage of automobiles were permitted has been
held invalid. This is so notwithstanding the desirability of such a classification. Vernon
Park Realty v. City of Mt. Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954).
23. See, e.g., O'Brien v. City of Chicago, 347 IIL. App. 45, 105 N.E2d 917 (1952)
(restriction related to traffic requirement). But see Board of Zoning Appeals v. Decatur, Ind.
Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses, supra note 22 (set back restrictions valid but off-strect parking as applied to the property unconstitutional).
24. Pentecostal Holiness Church v. Dunn, 243 Ma. 314, 27 So. 2d 51 (1946); Ellsworth
v. Gercke, 62 Ariz. 193, 156 P.2d 242 (1945); O'Brien v. City of Chicago, supra note 23;
Board of Zoning Appeals v. Decatur, Ind. Co. of Jehovah's Witnezze,: supra note 22;
Congregation Temple Israel v. City of Creve Couer, 320 S.W.2d 451 (Mo. 1959); State
ex rel. Roman Catholic Bishop v. Hill, 59 Nev. 231, 90 P.2d 217 (1939); Community
Synagogue v. Bates, 1 N.Y.2d 445, 136 N.E.2d 433, 154 N.YS.2d 15 (1956); Pelham
Jevish Center v. Marsh, 10 App. Div. 2d 645, 197 N.Y.S.2d 253 (2d Dep't 1960) (memorandum decision); Milwaukee Co. of Jehovah's Witnezses v. Mullen, 214 Ore. 231, 330 P.2d
5 (1953), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 436 (1959); State ex rel. Wenatchee Congregation of
Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Wenatchee, 50 Wash. 2d 373, 312 P.2d 195 (1957). Contra,
Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. City of Porterville, 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203 P2d 823
(Dist. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 333 U.S. 939 (1950) (court alluded to trafic congestion as one of the reasons for the ordinance); Miami Beach United Lutheran Church v.
City of Miami Beach, 82 So. 2d SS0 (Fla. 1955) (court alluded to traffic problem caucd
by wedding ceremonies and funeral services).
25. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. City of Chicago, 173 F.2d 214, 217 (7th Cir. 1949). The power
of the judiciary to review zoning ordinances is limited because it is a governmental and
legislative act. For this reason "if the validity of the legslative classification for zoning
purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must he allowed to control." Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US. 365, 333 (1926). See also Dennis v. Village of
Tonka Bay, 156 F.2d 672, 674 (8th Cir. 1946).
26. That traffic factors should be relevant in enacting zoning ordinances for new communities is pointed out in the remark: "Transportation has contributed in other vays to
the diminishing desirability of urban livng. The hazards and congestion of the highway:, the
noise and fumes of the motor vehicle, and the unsightline3 of the gas station and uted
car lot have all added to the run-down character of the urban region. Transpartation has
created many of the conditions that people strive to escape, but it has aLo provided the
means of escaping them and therefore the means of avoiding solutions. And it h--- tran
planted slums to the suburbs." Owen, The Metropolitan Transportation Problem 24-25
(1956).
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TRAFFIC CONSIDERED IN REZONING AND RECLASSIFICATION

The influence of traffic is more discernible in those cases involving an application for rezoning and reclassification. 27 In such a case, it is incumbent upon
the one seeking a reclassification to show either a mistake in the original zoning
or that conditions in the area have changed so as to warrant a rezoning.2
In Hardesty v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 29 a zoning board reclassified a
tract of land from a residential to a business zone wherein a shopping center
could be erected. The court, in reversing the decision of the board, stated: "[ T] o
so reclassify the property would be a plain violation of the statutory requirement against congestion in the streets." 30 The Hardesty rule has been followed
in numerous cases involving shopping centers, but the courts have been careful
to point out that it is not every traffic problem which must be given "material
31
consideration.

'

In Pecora v. Zoning Comm'n,32 a Connecticut court permitted a reclassification of an area and thereby legalized erection of a shopping center. The court

27. Where the rezoning or reclassification is made by the governing body, the courts will
assume a state of facts justifying the rezoning or reclassification. Goddard v. Stowers, 272
S.W.2d 400 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954). However, it must be pointed out that on application
for rezoning or reclassification, there is a presumption that the original zoning districts were
part of a comprehensive plan and, therefore, are valid. Zinn v. Board of Zoning Appeals,
207 Md. 355, 114 A.2d 614 (1955) (not the governing body).
Unlike a determination by the governing body where the scope of judicial review Is
restricted, see note 25 supra and accompanying text, a court in reviewing a decision of a
board of zoning appeals, in granting or denying the application for reclassification or
rezoning, looks to the evidence upon which its decision was predicated. Spencer v. Board
of Zoning Appeals, 141 Conn. 155, 104 A.2d 373 (1954) (application for variance). The
distinction is found in that the former is acting in a legislative capacity and the latter In
an administrative capacity.
28. Hardesty v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 211 Md. 172, 126 A.2d 621 (1956); Zlnn v.
Board of Zoning Appeals, supra note 27.
29. Note 28 supra.
30. 211 Md. at 18, 126 A.2d at 625. While the court pointed out that there was other
land in the immediate area on which the shopping center could be erected, it was more
concerned with the hazard that would be inflicted on the children in the area owing to
the additional traffic. Though such hazard could be remedied by a widening of the public
highways, the court concluded that such widening was not contemplated. Ibid. But see
Nelson v. County Council, 214 Md. 587, 136 A.2d 373 (1957) (per curiam), where a rezoning of property from residential to commercial was upheld since street congestion would
be remedied due to the immediate prospect of a widening of the street. See also Temmink v.
Board of Zoning Appeals, 212 Md. 6, 128 A.2d 256 (1957) (citing Hardesty with approval).
It is noteworthy that the court in Hardesty cited to the state enabling act which required a comprehensive plan "to lessen congestion in the streets." Md. Ann. Code art. 66B,
§ 21(c) (1957).
31. See, e.g., Price v. Cohen, 213 Md. 457, 132 A.2d 125 (1957). The court stated that
"traffic conditions should be given material consideration, and as this was not done by the
Board, its rezoning was arbitrary and an abuse of discretion. . . ...
Id. at 465, 132 A.2d at
129. The court, however, approved the lower court's dictum that if the widening of the
streets took place within a reasonable time a different decision would have resulted.
32. 145 Conn. 435, 144 A.2d 48 (1958).
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rejected the contention that traffic congestion would follow and stated that "it
is not the over-all volume of daily traffic, but 'congestion in the streets,' that
is, density of traffic, which is referred to in the statute." 1 In 1959, the Court
of Appeals of Mlaryland, in upholding the validity of a reclassification from
residential to business-local, 34 declared "that appellants have confused volume
with congestion." 35 The court went on to say that the congestion that existed
in the area resulted from disorderly flow and poor control. This type of congestion is within the province of the police department and not the zoning
authorities. 6
Traffic generation and congestion are, therefore, elements to be considered
in rezoning and reclassification. If the generating effect can be solved by the
proper position of traffic lights, stop signs, and other police regulations, the
rezoning or reclassification is proper. If, however, the generating effect will
adversely affect the community, rezoning is improper.3T
TRAiFFIc CONSIDERED IN GRANTING SPECLL EXCEPTIONS

At the outset, a distinction must be made between a "wariance" and an
"exception" or "special permit." A "v-ariance" is a departure from the terms
of a zoning ordinance and is authorized where a literal enforcement of its provisions would result in unnecessary hardships. Traffic does not to any degree
enter into the granting of a "variance." It is only necessary here to show
"that 'there are practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships in the way of
carrying out the strict letter of the provisions of ... [the] resolution' which
justify a variance. .. ."3 An "exception" in a zoning ordinance is a use permitted in a zoning district where certain facts and conditions detailed in the
33. Id. at 440, 144 A.2d at 51. But see Gordon v. Zoning Bd., 145 Conn. $97, 145 A.2d
746 (1958) (reclassification held illegal where increased traffic congestion resulted).
34. Vestry of St. Mark's Church v. Doub, 219 Md. 3S7, 149 A.2d 779 (1959).
35. Id. at 394, 149 A.2d at 733.
36. See also Bogert v. Township of Washington, 25 N.J. 57, 135 A.2d 1 (1957) (minor
traffic problems for police; major aspects affecting the community for the zoning authorities).
37. See Clesi v. Northwest Dallas Import Ass'n, 263 S.W. 2d 820 (Tem. Civ App. 1953)
(tremendous increase of traffic furnishes a reasonable basis for rezoning). Cf. Deli tisch v.
Town of Greenburgh, 135 N.Y.S.2d 220 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (improper to rezone propzrty lot
by lot merely because of traffic conditions). But see Linn v. Town of Hempstead, 10 Miec.
2d 774, 170 N.Y.S.2d 217 (Sup. Ct. 1957) (dictum) (traffic problems are for police and
not zoning authorities).
33. Montgomery County v. Alerlands Club, 202 Mld. 279, 96 A.Zd 261 (1953); Reed v.
Board of Standards & Appeals, 255 N.Y. 126, 174 N.E. 301 (1931).
39. Reed v. Board of Standards & Appeals, supra note 33, at 134, 174 N.E. at 303.
This standard has been criticized as poor and confusing. "The words 'practical difficulties or
unnecessary hardship' are an inheritance from one or two of the very early zoning ordinances. They were not well chosen then, and their continued use has ... bea very unfortunate. They almost defy critical analysis." Maltbie, The Legal Background of Zoning,
22 Conn. BJ. 6-7 (1943). Cf. KMairis v. Board of Appeal, 337 AlaMs. 523, 150 N.E2d 273
(1953) (court considered the elimination of a traffic hazard).
The requirement in a statute providing for a "variance" has ben wiely called a "afety
valve." Buchninster v. Zoning Bd., 69 R.. 396, 401, 33 A.2d 199, 202 (1943).
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In the field of "exceptions" traffic has an in-

Traffic, "Exceptions," and the Board of Zoning Appeals
The local legislative body (town or village boards) may delegate to a board
of zoning appeals4 1 the power to grant "exceptions." When delegating this
power they must prescribe certain standards or rules to govern the board's
action. A failure to set such standards will invalidate the ordinance as an un42
constitutional delegation of a legislative power to an administrative body.
The sufficiency of the standards required varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 43 As a result, the role of traffic in granting or denying "exceptions" is in
a precarious position.
In Small v. Moss, 44 an application was presented to the New York Commissioner of Licenses for a permit to operate a theatre. While this was not an
application to the board for an "exception," the decision in this case has great
bearing on the power of the board in New York. The license was refused
because of the traffic conditions that would result. The court of appeals held
that the commissioner had no power to deny the license on that ground. It
reasoned that the commissioner was purely an administrative agent whose
authority rests upon the authorizing ordinance. The court stated that he
may only apply the policy declared and the rules and standards laid down in statute and
ordinance, and we search there in vain for a rule or standard which would justify refusal
of a license for the erection of a theatre at a point where street traffic, and especially
4
traffic increased by a new theatre, would subject travelers upon the street to danger. 0

The appellate division further stated that the commissioner may not refuse to
grant a license on the ground that it would be detrimental to the general welfare. 46 The effect of this and other like decisions has been that a New York board
of zoning appeals, when passing on an application for an "exception," may not
consider traffic congestion unless the power to do so has been specifically
delegated to it.47
40. See note 38 supra.
41. It is also called Board of Adjustment (N.C.) or Board of Review (RI.).
42. E.g., Keating v. Patterson, 132 Conn. 210, 43 A.2d 659 (1945) ; Concordia Collegiate
Institute v. Miller, 301 N.Y. 189, 93 N.E.2d 632 (1950); Little v. Young, 299 N.Y. 299, 87
N.E.2d 74 (1949) (memorandum decision). See Osius v. City of St. Clair Shores, 344 Mich.
693, 75 N.W.2d 25 (1956).
43. For a discussion of the delegation of authority and the sufficiency of the standards
required in zoning ordinances, see Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 1083-1126 (1958).
44. 279 N.Y. 288, 18 N.E.2d 281 (1938).
45. Id. at 297, 18 N.E.2d at 284.
46. See Goelet v. Moss, 248 App. Div. 499, 290 N.Y. Supp. 573 (1st Dep't 1936), afi'd, 273
N.Y. 503, 6 N.E.2d 425 (1937), where the Commissioner of Licenses refused to grant a
license to operate a theatre and the court stated "that the duty of the licensor is to consider
the question from the standpoint of public health, safety, and morals only and not as a
problem in city planning." Id. at 501, 290 N.Y.Supp. at 575.
47. Bar Harbour Shopping Center, Inc. v. Andrews, 23 Misc. 2d 894, 196 N.Y.S.2d 856
(Sup. Ct. 1959) (dictum); Plander v. Koehler, 150 N.Y.S.2d 879 (Sup. Ct. 1956). Here,
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Other jurisdictions, however, have held that traffic congestion may be considered. In In tle Matter of O'Hara,43 an "exception" was sought under an
ordinance which stated that the board should provide for the public health,
safety, morals and general welfare. The court held that this standard was
sufficient and did not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of power. 49 The
court went on to consider the problem of traffic under safety and general welfare, stating:
It is not any anticipated increase in traffic which will justify the refusal of a "spedal
exception" in a zoning case. The anticipated increase in traffic must be of such character that it bears a substantial relation to the health and safety of the community.sO
This rule, when examined in the light of decisions involving an application
for an "exception" to a town or village board, would seem the more reasonable
and practical approach.
Traffic, "Exceptions" and the Town or Village Board
The legislative body (town or village board) may retain the power to pass
on the application for an "exception."'" In cases granting or denying the application, the status of the board, at times, has become confused.P2 In 109 Main
St. Corp. v. Burns,-3 a board refused to grant an application for an "exception" to build a gasoline filling station. It did so on the grounds that if the
"exception" were granted, certain traffic problems would ensue. This determination was found to be arbitrary and capricious. The court, in reversing the
board's decision, stated that consideration of traffic congestion was not within
the province of the board, and went on to make the astute observation that
traffic problems are for the police and not the zoning authorities. No distinction was drawn between minor traffic conditions and conditions affecting the
the board considered the traffic burden in the area and the court stated that "we are faced
.. with a decision based on considerations not to be found within the four corners of the
ordinance." Id. at SS2. Some New York courts have gone further and have held that traffic
congestion is for the police and not the zoning authorities. Ibid., and cases cited therein.
The Plander case even put the burden on the board to show that the provisions in the
ordinance were not being complied with, and thereby cancelled the applicant's duty to
show that he has met the requirements of the ordinance.
4S. 389 Pa. 35, 131 A.2d 557 (1957).
49. See also Schmidt v. Board of Adjustment, 9 NJ. 405, 33 A.2d 607 (1952); Holy
Sepulchre Cemetery v. Town of Greece, 191 Misc. 241, 79 N.Y.S.2d 633 (Sup. CL 1947),
aff'd, 273 App. Div. 942, 79 N.Y.S.2d S63 (4th Dep't 1943).
50. 3S9 Pa. at 54, 131 A.2d at 596.

51. The legislative bodies may delegate this function. See notes 41 & 42 supra and
accompanying text. They may, however, refuse to delegate this power and grant the

"exceptions" themselves. See Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927) ; Green Point Say. Bank v.
Board of Zoning Appeals, 281 N.Y. 534, 24 N.E.2d 319 (1939), appeal dismis d, 303 US.
633 (1940).
52. See text accompanying notes 14 & 15 supra for board's source of authority and
purposes within which it must operate.
53. 14 Misc. 2d 1037, 179 N.Y.S.2d 60 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
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whole community. This reasoning was also advanced in another decision"
wherein the court stated: "[A]pparently, considerations of traffic burdens and
hazards are for the police and not zoning boards."55 The courts, in neither
case, considered the statutory requirement "to lessen congestion in the
streets." 56
In 1959, a novel view was presented in Bar Harbour Shopping Center, Inc. v.
Andrews,57 a New York case which again involved an application to erect a
gasoline filling station. The application was rejected by a village board. In
passing upon this determination, the court reviewed the existing status of the
law. In an effort to reconcile the prior cases, the court reasoned that the decisions must have turned on a finding that, when boards reserve to themselves the
power to pass on an "exception," they act administratively."5 The only other
alternative was to conclude that previous courts had completely disregarded
the provision in the enabling statutes. 9 The court rejected this conclusion and
put forth its own theory, i.e., that a village or town board which reserves to
itself the power to grant "exceptions" acts in a "hybrid" manner. Under this
theory, the board, when passing on an "exception," acts as a legislative body
in that it may consider traffic congestion engendered by the use sought in the
"exception." However, in so far as judicial review is concerned, the board will
be governed by the rules applied to administrative bodies. 60
New York is not alone in making such a distinction. The Virginia courts have
gone even further. In City of Winchester v. Glover,01 a zoning ordinance,
which permitted gasoline filling stations only after a "special permit" was
granted by the town council, was declared unconstitutional. The ordinances
under attack provided that a permit shall be refused if the use would endanger
the public safety. The absence of specific standards to guide the board was
fatal since the court held "that a city council is empowered both to legislate
and administrate, and in passing upon the permit here in question it was acting
' 62
solely in an administrative capacity.
CONCLUSION

There seems to be no reason why an administrative body should not consider the problem of traffic congestion resulting from a use permitted under
54. Edelman v. Town Bd., 14 Misc. 2d 953, 179 N.Y.S.2d 58 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
55. Id. at 954, 179 N.Y.S.2d at 59.
56. N.Y. Town Law § 263; N.Y. Village Law § 177.
57.

23 Misc. 2d 894, 196 N.Y.S.2d 856 (Sup. Ct. 1959).

58. Id. at 903-04, 196 N.Y.S.2d at 868-69. In effect, the court is saying that the board
acting in this fashion has undertaken to act as its own board of appeals and is thereby
bound by the limitations imposed on an administrative body. See also Young Men's Christian Ass'n v. Burns, 207 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
59. See note 56 supra. The result of this determination is that traffic cannot be considered since the board is limited to the "four corners of the ordinance." See note 47 supra.
60. Bar Harbour Shopping Center, Inc. v. Andrews, 23 Misc. 2d at 910, 196 N.Y.S.2d
at 874. The findings of the board must be based on "substantial evidence." Ibid.
61.

199 Va. 70, 97 S.E.2d 661 (1957).

62. Id. at 72, 97 S.E.2d at 663. See also North Bay Village v. Blackwell, 88 So. 2d 524
(Fla. 1956).

